

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

**FILED**  
IN CLERK'S OFFICE  
U.S. DISTRICT COURT E.D.N.Y.  
★ SEP 03 2010 ★  
BROOKLYN OFFICE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

– against –

RICHARD MONCRIEFFE,

Defendant.

09-CR-711

Statement of Reasons Pursuant to  
18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2)



JACK B. WEINSTEIN, Senior United States District Judge:

A sentencing court shall “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). If the sentence is not of the kind prescribed by, or is outside the range of, the sentencing guidelines referred to in section 3553(a)(4), the court shall indicate the specific reasons for imposing a sentence different from the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). These “reasons must also be stated with specificity in the written order of judgment and commitment.” *Id.* Even though the mandatory nature of the guidelines has been excised and they are now “advisory,” see *United States v. Booker*, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005), the sentencing court must still adhere to the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). *United States v. Jones*, 460 F.3d 191, 197 (2d Cir. 2006).

The sentencing court’s written statement of reasons shall be “a simple, fact-specific statement explaining why the guidelines range did not account for a specific factor or factors under § 3553(a).” *United States v. Rattoballi*, 452 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2006). Such a statement should demonstrate that the court “considered the parties’ arguments and that it has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority.” *United States v. Cavera*, 550 F.3d 180, 193 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting *Rita v. United States*, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Although a written statement of reasons pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) is not necessary when the court imposes a guidelines sentence, the statement may nevertheless assist the reviewing court and the United States Sentencing Commission in understanding the reasons for the court's sentence.

On January 25, 2010, Richard Moncrieffe pled guilty to the sole count of a one-count indictment that charged that on September 17, 2009, Moncrieffe, having previously been convicted in a criminal court of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, possessed, in and affecting commerce, a Titan Tiger .38 caliber semiautomatic and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).

Moncrieffe was sentenced on August 18, 2010. The proceeding was videotaped in order to develop an accurate record of the courtroom atmosphere and the factors and considerations that a district court must evaluate in imposing a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). *See In re Sentencing*, 219 F.R.D. 262, 264-65 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (utility on appeal).


The court finds the total offense level to be twelve and defendant's criminal history category to be category II, yielding a guidelines range of imprisonment of between twelve and eighteen months.

Moncrieffe was sentenced to one year and one day of incarceration and three years' supervised release. A \$100 special assessment was imposed.

Respectful consideration was given to the sentencing guidelines, the Sentencing Commission's policy statements and all other factors listed under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to ensure that the sentence is "sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes" of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). A sentence within the guidelines range is appropriate in this case. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A).

The court considered the “nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The offense is a serious one. The defendant has strong family ties. A sentence of one year and one day reflects the seriousness of the offense and will promote respect for the law and provide just punishment. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).

Under section 3553(a)(2)(B), there are two major considerations: specific and general deterrence. General deterrence is satisfied with the sentence imposed. The sentence will send a clear message that the possession of firearms by a convicted felon will result in a substantial prison sentence. Specific deterrence is achieved through incapacitation and the impact of this conviction on the defendant’s employability. It is unlikely that he will engage in further criminal activity in light of his family ties and likely deportation. No findings of citizenship were made.

  
Jack B. Weinstein  
Senior United States District Judge

Dated: August 25, 2010  
Brooklyn, New York